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A long tradition has emphasized civic virtue in explaining political institutions. In the Republic, Plato argued that governments vary in accordance with the dis‑
positions of their citizenry. In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville argued 
that civic behavior is essential for stable and effective democratic institutions. More 
recently, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) attempted to explain differ‑
ences in democratic governance in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Mexico, 
and Germany through a set of political attitudes and orientations grouped under the 
rubric of civic culture. Robert D. Putnam (1993) argued, in an influential compara‑
tive study of regional governments in Italy, that the success of democracies depends 
in large part on civic virtue. As far as we know, this line of inquiry has not been used 
to analyze the influence of civic virtue on labor market institutions. This is quite 
surprising, as one important goal of labor market institutions is to provide insurance, 
the design of which might be influenced by civic virtue.1
In our paper, we argue that civic virtue plays a critical role in explaining the 
design of the main public insurance institutions of the labor market: unemployment 
benefits and employment protection. We are able to measure civic attitudes in a 
1 The role of beliefs and values on economic outcomes is of growing interest in the economic literature. For 
instance, cultural differences turn out to have an impact on financial development (Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza
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Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions†
By Yann Algan and Pierre Cahuc*
We argue civic virtue plays a key role in explaining the design of pub-
lic insurance against unemployment risks by solving moral hazard 
issues which hinder the efficiency of unemployment insurance. We 
show, in a simple model, that economies with stronger civic virtues 
are more prone to provide insurance through unemployment ben-
efits rather than through job protection. We provide cross-country 
empirical evidence of a strong correlation between civic attitudes 
and the design of unemployment benefits and employment protec-
tion in OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2003. We then use 
an epidemiological approach to estimate the existence of a potential 
causal relationship from inherited civic virtue to labor market insur-
ance institutions. 1JEL: J41, J65, J68, Z132
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precise (but narrow) way by using the following question in international social sur‑
veys: “Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in 
between to claim government/state benefits to which you have no rights.” We show 
that cross‑country differences in unemployment benefits and employment protection 
legislation are influenced deeply by differences in the answers to this question across 
countries. We show that this influence still holds when we use other indicators of 
civic attitudes, such as indicators of trustworthiness and trust.
The relationship between civic virtue, unemployment benefits, and job protection 
is then derived in a simple model (presented in Section I) in which unemployment 
benefits and job protection are shaped by a government2 that maximizes a social 
welfare function. This model shows that the provision of unemployment insurance is 
more costly in economies in which civic attitudes make it more acceptable to cheat 
on unemployment benefits, leading the government to provide lower unemployment 
benefits.3 In this case, the government provides insurance by using a less efficient 
institution–employment protection. Moral hazard thus hampers the government’s 
ability to implement efficient insurance institutions.4
In Section II, we use international individual surveys to document the cross‑coun‑
try heterogeneity in civic values across Organization for Economic Co‑operation 
and Development (OECD) countries during the period 1980–2003. Two polar cases 
show up. The first one is made up of Nordic countries and, to a lesser extent, Anglo‑
Saxon countries, in which the majority of the population finds it unjustifiable to 
cheat on government benefits. At the other extreme stand Latin American and 
Mediterranean countries where the majority of the population would not blame such 
and Luigi Zingales 2004), fertility rates (Raquel Fernández, Alessandra Fogli, and Claudia Olivetti 2004, 
Fernández and Fogli 2005), employment rates (Algan and Cahuc 2005, Fernández and Fogli 2005), and on indi‑
viduals’ prior on social mobility (Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser 2004). In the same spirit, the paper of 
Andrea Ichino and Giovanni Maggi (2000), which documents the existence of north‑south regional differences in 
regard to shirking of  responsibility in a large Italian bank, suggests that civic culture is influenced by individuals’ 
historical heritage. This literature also stresses that the degree of trust or civicmindedness has a direct impact on 
economic development and growth as suggested by Algan and Cahuc (2007), Guido Tabellini (2005), and Stephen 
Knack and Philip Keefer (1997). The importance of civic culture and trust was first explored in sociology and 
political science by Edward C. Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993).
2 In the seminal papers of the “implicit contract” (Martin Neil Baily 1974 and Costas Azariadis 1975), unem‑
ployment insurance is provided by employers. However, in the real world, unemployment insurance is always 
provided by government or public agencies and not by firms because selection and moral hazard problems make 
it impossible for firms to provide unemployment benefits directly (Jaakko Kiander 1993, W. Henry Chui and Edi 
Karni 1998). When unemployment insurance is provided by public authorities, it is worth introducing employ‑
ment protection, in the form of layoff taxes, to induce firms to take account of the fiscal externalities linked to 
their job destruction decisions (Martin S. Feldstein 1976; Kenneth Burdett and Randall Wright 1989a,b; Olivier 
Blanchard and Jean Tirole 2004).
3 Tito J. Boeri, Igniacio Conde‑Ruiz, and Vincenzo Galasso (2004) also provide a model that exhibits a trade‑
off between unemployment benefits and job protection. However, the trade‑off stems from distributional conflicts 
between high‑skilled and low‑skilled workers. 
4 The role of preferences and values in shaping labor market outcomes is of growing interest in the litera‑
ture. Richard B. Freeman (2000) argues that diversity of labor market institutions among advanced countries 
stems from cross‑country differences in preferences for redistribution. Other contributions have claimed that 
differences in labor market institutions and outcomes are rooted in the higher weight put on home production in 
European countries (Richard Rogerson 2003, Freeman and Ronald Shettkat 2005), come from stronger prefer‑
ences for leisure (Blanchard 2004; Alesina, Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote 2005), and from more traditional family 
values in Continental European countries and Mediterranean countries (Algan and Cahuc 2005). Blanchard and 
Thomas Philippon (2006) follow a route closer to ours by arguing that labor market performance is influenced by 
the quality of labor relations, which is deeply ingrained in cultural features.
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attitudes. Moreover, we show that civic attitudes are shaped, to a large extent, by 
country‑specific effects rather than individual characteristics.
We then provide evidence of cross‑country correlations between national civic 
attitudes and the design of insurance institutions. Countries displaying high civic 
values tend to insure their workers through unemployment benefits instead of using 
stringent employment protection. Such a relationship is robust to the inclusion of 
country fixed effects which account for time invariant national features and which 
could affect the design of unemployment insurance and employment protection. This 
finding is consistent with the sharp, opposing pattern between the flexicurity model 
in Nordic countries such as Denmark, which combines very generous unemploy‑
ment benefits with low job protection, and Continental European and Mediterranean 
countries, which mainly insure households against labor market risks through 
employment protection legislation.
Naturally, the correlation between civic attitudes and the design of labor market 
institutions does not mean that there is a causal relationship that goes from social 
attitudes to the unemployment benefits/employment protection trade‑off. There is a 
concern for potential reverse causality since labor market institutions are likely to 
affect civic attitudes. For instance, the administrative inefficiencies in the provision 
of unemployment insurance could influence the guilty feelings about cheating on 
unemployment benefits.
To deal with this reverse causality issue, we estimate the inherited part of civic 
attitudes that are not instantaneously influenced by the economic and institutional 
environment of the country in which people are living. We follow an epidemio‑
logical approach (see Fernández 2007) by estimating the civic attitudes inherited by 
the American‑born from their ancestors country of origin using the General Social 
Survey database for the period 1977–2002. We show that the civic attitudes of peo‑
ple who were born and are living in the United States are strongly influenced by the 
country of origin of their ancestors. This result is consistent with the earlier findings 
on the transmission of civic culture and democracy from Europe to America (Tom 
W. Rice and Jan Feldman 1997). We then use this inherited part of civic attitudes 
by country of origin as an instrument for civic attitudes in the home country.5 This 
strategy enables us to conclude that there is a significant impact of civic attitudes on 
unemployment benefits and on employment protection in OECD countries during 
the period of 1980–2003.
I. The Model
This model shows how moral hazard caused by uncivic attitudes could influence 
the implementation of efficient labor market institutions. If it is difficult to provide 
unemployement insurance because of moral hazard, the incidence of unemploy‑
ment can be decreased by using employment protection but at some efficiency 
cost.
5 See Algan and Cahuc (2007) for a similar strategy used to uncover the causal effect of social attitudes on 
economic development since World War II.
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We consider an economy in which a numeraire good is produced with labor. There 
is a continuum of workers for which the size is normalized to one. Workers can 
be either employed or unemployed. Employed workers get a wage w. Unemployed 
workers get unemployment benefits b provided by the government. At the beginning 
of the period, all workers are unemployed. Each worker can then decide to search for 
a job or not. The job search effort is not verifiable.
Preferences over consumption and job search effort are represented by the util‑
ity function v 1c 2 2 ℓ e 2 11 2 ℓ 2g, where c $ 0 stands for consumption, and v is 
an increasing, concave, and twice derivable function. The variable ℓ is an indicator 
equal to one if the individual provides a search effort which costs e . 0 and is equal 
to zero otherwise. Preferences are influenced by social norms. More precisely, the 
utility of unemployed workers who get unemployment benefits b is equal to v 1b 2 2 e 
if they provide search effort 1ℓ 5 12 and to v 1b 2 2 g, g $ 0 if they do not look for 
a job 1ℓ 5 02 . The parameter g stands for the utility loss induced by an individuals’ 
feeling of guilt for cheating on unemployment benefits.6 In the following, we focus 
on the consequences of such guilt feelings on the design of unemployment insurance 
and job protection.7
There is potentially a large number of firms that can create jobs. Creating a job 
entails fixed costs denoted by k . 0. A job produces x units of the numeraire good, 
where x [ R is an idiosyncratic shock drawn in a distribution with a continuous, dif‑
ferentiable, cumulative distribution function denoted by g. The productivity shock, x , 
which is private information held by the firm, is not contractible. Firms enter into com‑
petition to offer wages to workers before the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks that 
are known only after workers have been hired. Once the shocks are realized, employ‑
ers may want to fire workers. It costs f to fire a worker.8 As workers are assumed to be 
perfectly mobile, competition between firms entails zero expected profits.
There is a government that provides unemployment benefits financed by payroll 
taxes, denoted by t, and by layoff taxes, denoted by f. 9 We assume that the govern‑
ment maximizes the sum of the expected utility of workers.10
6 Another potential interpretation for g is that of a social stigma or nonpecuniary psychic costs associated with 
the condition of unemployment. Our preferred interpretation of g as guilt feelings is grounded in the fact that we 
have empirical data to measure this coefficient.
7 Assuming that guilt feelings are proportional to the degree of free riding on social benefits would yield 
similar results.
8 The model focuses exclusively on the moral hazard associated with unemployment insurance. Actually, the 
design of the employment protection legislation may also depend on moral hazard problems within the firm. The 
moral hazard issue is likely to be much more of a concern for the unemployed, however, since their behavior is, 
by nature, much more difficult to monitor than that of workers present in the workplace. We shall see the empiri‑
cal results suggest that our approach is relevant to the extent that we find evidence of a negative impact of civic 
attitudes on employment protection. Moreover, we focus on the moral hazard raised by unemployment benefits 
due to data limitation. International social surveys mainly document attitudes toward public transfers, which are 
not necessarily systematically related to attitudes about the workplace.
9 For the sake of simplicity, in the model, the firing cost is interpreted as a layoff tax used to finance unem‑
ployment benefits. Usually, employment protection legislation is made of restrictions which force the employer 
to transfer income to the fired workers. Advanced notice is an example of such restrictions. This dimension of 
employment protection, which induces the waste of resources, is not accounted for in our model. Our analysis 
goes through as long as employment protection is not a pure waste that yields no benefits to employees. 
10 It is well known that the maximization of the sum of the expected utilities can be the outcome of an  election 
process, if elections are represented by the probabilistic voting model in which there are two candidates who 
announce their electoral platforms simultaneously and noncooperatively (see Torsten Persson and Tabellini 2000, 
chapter 3). 
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The time sequence of events runs as follows:
	 •	 The	government	announces	the	policy	1t,  f, b 2 .
	 •	 Workers	choose	their	level	of	search	effort.	At	the	beginning	of	the	period,	all	
 workers are unemployed. Only workers who produce a high level of search 
effort are matched with firms. The others remain unemployed and get unem‑
ployment benefits b.
	 •	 Employers	compete	to	hire	workers.
	 •	 The	idiosyncratic	productivity	shocks,	x, occur and employers decide whether 
to keep the worker or eliminate the job. Employers pay wages and payroll taxes 
on every continuing job. The elimination of a job gives rise to the payment of 
layoff taxes. Employed workers get wage w, unemployed workers get unem‑
ployment benefits b.
This problem can be solved by backward induction. The market equilibrium is 
solved in the first stage. Then, the optimal policy is determined.
A. Market Equilibrium
Market equilibrium yields labor contracts that allow workers to achieve the maxi‑
mum level of expected utility compatible with zero expected profits. Labor contracts 
only include flat wages since the productivity parameter x is private information of the 
firm, which is not contractible. Moreover, it is assumed that firms cannot commit ex 
ante to a reservation value of productivity by keeping aside funds payable to a third 
party in case of layoff (see the discussion in Blanchard and Tirole 2004). Accordingly, 
at step 4, firms destroy jobs if and only if their profits, x 2 w 2 t, are lower than 
their destruction costs, f. The job destruction decision boils down to the choice of a 
reservation value for the productivity parameter x, denoted by X, below which jobs are 
destroyed. The reservation productivity reads
(1)  X 5 w 1 t 2 f .
The job destruction rate is equal to g 1X 2 . Given the expression X of the reserva‑
tion productivity, there is a single value11 of the wage compatible with the zero profit 
condition:
(2)  3
X
1`
 1x 2 w 2 t2 dg 1x 2 2 g 1X 2 f 5 k.
11 As the expected profit decreases with respect to w, there is a single, positive equilibrium value for the wage 
if and only if the two following conditions are fulfilled:
3
t2
1`
f
 1x 2 t2 dg 1x 2 2 g 1t 2 f  2 f 2 k . 0,
lim 3
w1
1`
t2f
 1x 2 w 2 t2 dg 1x 2 2 g 1w + t 2 f 2 f 2 k , 0.
These conditions are assumed to be fulfilled.
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Equations (1) and (2) define, together with the balanced budget constraint of the 
government,
(3)  t 31 2 g 1X 2 4 1 1 f 2 b 2 g 1X 2 5 0,
the market equilibrium value of the wage w and the reservation productivity X for 
the set of feasible policies 1t,  f, b 2 . Let us now analyze the choice of the unemploy‑
ment benefits, payroll taxes, and layoff taxes.
B. Optimal Policy
The optimal policy maximizes the expected utilities of workers
 31 2 g 1X 2 4 v 1w 2 1 g 1X 2 v 1b 2 2 e,
subject to three constraints:12
	 •	 The	incentive	compatibility	constraint
(4)  31 2 g 1X 2 4 v 1w 2 1 g 1X 2 v 1b 2 2 e $ v 1b 2 2 g,
	 •	 The	government	balanced	budget	constraint	(3),
	 •	 The	zero	profit	condition	(2).
It is useful to rewrite this program as the maximization of the sum of expected 
utilities with respect to 1w, X, b 2 subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (4) 
and to the equation
(5)  3
X
1`
 1x 2 w 2 dg 1x 2 2 g 1X 2b 5 k,
that is obtained by summing up the balanced budget constraint of the government 
(3) and the zero profit condition (2). Then, once the optimal value of 1w, X, b 2 is 
determined, it is possible to use equations (1) and (2) to find out the optimal value 
of 1t,  f, b 2 .
The computation of the optimal value of 1w, X, b 2 , presented in Appendix B, leads 
to the first result:
RESULT 1: Full insurance, with w 5 b, can be obtained only if the utility loss induced by 
guilt feelings is sufficiently large.
When the utility cost of cheating on unemployment benefits is high, the incen‑
tive compatibility condition (4) is not binding, and the government can provide full 
12 We apply the revelation principle so that everyone looks for a job in equilibrium.
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insurance. It also turns out that the reservation productivity amounts to zero 1X 5 02 
when individuals are perfectly insured. Otherwise, the optimal value of 1w, X, b 2 is 
defined by equation (5) and by
 v 1w 2 2 v 1b 2
(6)  X 5 w 2 b 2       ,
 v9 1w 2
 e 2 g
(7) v 1w 2 2 v 1b 2 5      . 0.
 1 2 g 1X2
Equation (7) is merely the binding incentive compatibility condition, that shows 
that the wage is larger than the unemployment benefits if utility losses associ‑
ated with guilt feelings are small enough.13 Equation (6) shows that the govern‑
ment decides to keep jobs filled up to the point where the utility cost (in numeraire 
good units) of job destruction, 1v 1w 2 2 v 1b 2 2 / 1v9 1w 2 2 , is equal to the gains of job 
destruction,14 w 2 b 2 x. These two equations lead to the following result (see the 
proofs in Appendix B):
RESULT 2: unemployment benefits and the reservation productivity increase with 
respect to guilt feelings.
Result 2 can be understood as follows. First, when guilt feelings are lower, unem‑
ployment benefits are decreased to insure that workers devote sufficient effort to 
the job search. Furthermore, when guilt feelings decrease, since v 1w 2 2 v 1b 2 5 1e 2 g 2 / 11 2 g 1X 2 2 , the utility cost of job destruction increases and the optimal 
reservation productivity drops.
The scheme 1t,  f,  b 2 that allows the government to implement the optimal value of 1w, X, b 2 is defined by equation (6), by the definition of the reservation productivity 
(1), and by the zero profit condition (2) which reads, using (1),
 f 5 3
X
1`
 1x 2 X2 dg 1x 2 2 k.
This last expression of the zero profit condition implies that layoff taxes decrease 
with the reservation productivity. This expression, along with Result 2, leads to 
Result 3.
RESULT 3: Layoff taxes decrease with respect to guilt feelings.
13 A more rigourous presentation is provided in Appendix B.
14 Note that X in equation (6) is negative when the incentive compatibility constraint is binding. The reason is 
that there is zero utility of leisure. If the utility of unemployed workers is v 1 m 1 b 2 , where m $ 0 stands for the 
utility of leisure rather than v 1b 2 , then X can be positive (although less than m).
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The interpretation of this result is straightforward. When guilt feelings are stron‑
ger, the government can provide higher unemployment benefits. Since workers are 
better insured when they lose their job, it is optimal to destroy more jobs. This situ‑
ation can be achieved with lower layoff taxes.
The next section provides empirical tests of the main predictions of the theoreti‑
cal model, in which better civic attitudes toward government benefits lead to lower 
job protection and higher unemployment benefits.
II. Empirical Results
In this section, we estimate to what extent cross‑country differences in civic atti‑
tudes could explain the observed heterogeneity in the design of public insurance 
policies on the labor markets. First, we document that people living in different 
OECD countries do differ significantly in their civic attitudes toward government 
benefits, these differences being mainly explained by country‑specific features. We 
then provide evidence of cross‑country correlations between unemployment benefits 
(UB), employment protection (EP), and national civic values that are in line with the 
predictions of our theoretical framework. Finally, we present our instrumental vari‑
able approach in order to deal with reverse causality issues.
B. Cross-country Differences in Civic Attitudes
Data on Civic Attitudes.—Evidence of cross‑country differences in civic atti‑
tudes are based on the World Values Survey (WVS) database, which provides ques‑
tions on civic attitudes for an extensive set of countries including OECD, Eastern 
European, and Latin American countries. The WVS database is made up of three 
main waves: 1981–1984, 1990–1993, and 1999–2003, denoted henceforth as 1980, 
1990, and 2000.15 The coverage depends on the wave, starting with 22 countries in 
the 1980 wave, and ending with around 80 countries in the last wave.
The WVS database provides a specific question on civic attitudes directly related 
to our model. The question reads as follow: “Do you think it can always be justi-
fied, never be justified or something in between to claim government/state benefits 
to which you have no rights?” The answers are given on an ordered scale from 1 
for “Never justifiable” to 10 for “Always justifiable.” To ease the interpretation of 
the results, we group the answer categories together to represent individuals with 
strong civic attitudes. We create a dummy variable which takes on the value one 
if the respondent answered “Never justifiable” in the WVS, and zero otherwise. 
As a robustness check, we also run the regressions on the original variable ranked 
between 1 and 10, and test different mappings from the ordered 1–10 variable into a 
1–0 dummy.16 The question on civic attitudes with respect to government benefits is 
certainly the most relevant one for investigating the link between civicmindedness 
15 The WVS also provides a wave in 1995 but for a smaller set of countries and questions.
16 Note that only the two extreme answers, one and ten, are labeled in the questionnaire and thus have a clear 
meaning for the respondent. This is why our preferred mapping groups together the answers “Never justifiable” 
on one side and all other answers on the other side.
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and public insurance policies. This question directly measures the extent of moral 
hazard, identified as a guilty feeling in the model, which could undermine the provi‑
sion of efficient unemployment insurance.17
Yet, the extent to which this moral issue could matter in explaining the will‑
ingness of people to support public insurance policies is also likely to depend on 
whether they believe in the trustworthiness of others. We measure this dimension by 
using the following question on trust: “generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
The answer is given on a 1–0 scale, the variable being equal to one if the respondent 
believes in the trustworthiness of others and zero otherwise.
Our analysis includes the main OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. We also include formerly planned economies: Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and Poland. To some extent these countries provide a useful, natu‑
ral experiment since they have implemented different labor market institutions fol‑
lowing a common shock caused by the fall of communism. By grouping the different 
countries and different waves together, this selection leaves us with 76,221 work‑
ing‑age individuals in the WVS database. The number of observations by country 
reaches at least 1,107 individuals in the WVS database (see Appendix D for sum‑
mary statistics).
Cross-country Differences.—We start with simple cross‑country evidence on the 
average level of civic attitudes. Figure 1 reports the basic mean reply to our main 
question concerning government benefits by averaging the three waves of the WVS 
database. This figure already highlights important facts. First, a much larger share 
of individuals in Nordic countries display strong civic attitudes. Denmark is a clear 
outlier with 88 percent of households strongly blaming cheating on government 
benefits. Such a civic stand is shared by almost 80 percent of individuals in other 
Nordic countries such as Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Second, European 
countries lag far behind their Nordic counterparts. On average, no more than 65 
percent of individuals in Continental European and Mediterranean countries blame 
uncivil behavior. Third, the former planned economies in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America resemble Continental and Mediterranean European countries. The only 
outlier is Hungary, which is much closer to Nordic countries on this issue. We will 
see later that it is the only Eastern European country to have implemented generous 
unemployment insurance. Fourth, the Anglo‑Saxon countries stand in an intermedi‑
ate position, between Nordic countries and the others, with more than 70 percent 
of households blaming uncivic attitudes. It is also shown in Appendix D that the 
17 The WVS questions about cheating on government benefits could also reflect more general beliefs about 
the sources of an individuals misfortunes. Individuals who think that society is responsible for one becoming 
unemployed (rather than the lack of one’s own effort) could be less reluctant to cheat on unemployment benefit. 
This channel can be measured by the WVS question: “Why, in your opinion, are there people who live in need? 
Because of laziness and lack of willpower or because society treats them unfairly?” Yet, the answer to this ques‑
tion turns out to be only weakly, positively correlated with the answers concerning cheating on government 
benefits, with a correlation of 0.087 over the three waves of the WVS database.
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ordering of countries with regard to civic attitudes has remained stable between the 
waves 1980 and 2000.
We now look more closely at the national components of civic attitudes. We run a 
series of regressions of the following form:
(8) ait 5 a 1 Fc 1 gXit 1 Ft 1 eit ,
where ait represents civic attitudes of individual i at date t. Xit is our control for 
individual characteristics such as age, sex, education, income category, employment 
status, religious affiliation, and political orientation. Ft is a time dummy variable. eit 
is a random error term at date t.
The national component of civic attitudes is captured by country fixed effects Fc, 
representing dummy variables for the country c, where the individual i is observed 
at date t. Denmark, which displays the highest average level of civic attitude, is used 
as the reference group. To disentangle the country‑specific effect, we also control 
for the main individual characteristics such as gender, age and age squared, years of 
education, employment status, income category, political orientation, and religious 
affiliation. This estimation is run on the three main waves of the WVS (1980, 1990, 
2000).
Table 1 reports the probit estimates of the civic variable. The dependent variable 
takes the value one if the respondent thinks that cheating on government benefits is 
never justifiable and zero otherwise. All the standard errors are corrected for cluster‑
ing at the country level. Table 1 shows that all country dummies are significant at 
the 1 percent level. And the adjusted R‑squared is almost three times as high with 
0
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Figure 1
notes: Mean reply to the question: “Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in 
between to claim government/state benefits to which you have no rights.” The score associated with the answer 
“never” is one. The score of other answers is zero.
source: WVS 1980, 1990, 2000.
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country fixed effects than the one generated by the specification without country 
fixed effects.18
The marginal coefficients of each country are reported in Figure 2. They indi‑
cate to what extent living in countries other than Denmark lowers the probability of 
displaying good civic attitudes. The coefficients go from 0 for the reference group 
(Denmark) to 20.58 for individuals living in Greece, which displays the lowest level 
of civic attitudes. Latin American and Mediterranean countries display, in general, 
the highest gap in civic culture with Denmark. Compared to Denmark, the probabil‑
ity of having good civic attitudes is 54 percent lower in Mexico, 32 percent lower in 
Spain, 29 percent lower in Portugal, and 25 percent lower in Italy. Another distinc‑
tive group consists of Eastern European countries in which the probability of shar‑
ing high civic stands is 35 percent lower in Slovakia and 33 percent lower in Poland. 
Hungary is an outlier which displays civic attitudes more comparable to those of 
18 The specifications without country fixed effects yields an R2 5 0.036. We have also checked for different speci‑
fications with country‑specific trends and interactions between country fixed effects and individual characteristics.
Similarly, we have also run the same regressions by including, as demographic controls, only exogenous vari‑
ables (age and gender) and excluding potential endogenous characteristics such as employment status. The results 
across these different specifications were fairly similar.
Table 1—Probit Estimation of Civic Attitudes
Cheat on government benefits:
Never justifiable 5 1
Dependent variable   Coeff. Std. error
Country dummies Yes***
Male 20.067*** 10.0112
Age 0.033*** 10.0012
Age2 20.000*** 10.0002
Education 0.035*** 10.0022
Unemployed Reference
Employed 0.165*** 10.0252
Inactive 0.102*** 10.0272
Income_class: middle Reference
Low_class 20.181*** 10.0132
High_class 0.044*** 10.0152
Political orientation:
 Center Reference
Left 20.047*** 10.0142
Right 0.090*** 10.0142
Religious affiliation:
 No_religion Reference
Catholic 0.010 10.5832
Protestant 0.085*** 10.0222
Buddhist 20.001 10.0502
Muslim 20.106 10.1142
Jewish 0.000 10.9922
Other_religion 0.034 10.0292
Time dummies Yes***
Pseudo‑R2 0.098
Observations 60,014
notes: WVS database 1980, 1990, 2000. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the coun‑
try level:
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Continental European countries. The group of countries much closer to Denmark 
is made up of Nordic and Anglo‑Saxon countries. Civic attitudes in Norway and 
Australia are only 6 percent and 12 percent lower than in Denmark.
Table 1 also reports the role of individual characteristics. The probability of con‑
sidering it unjustifiable to cheat on government benefits increases with the level of 
education, age, and employment status (whether one is employed or unemployed). 
Being Protestant or belonging to the right wing is also associated with better civic 
attitudes. But, it turns out that the coefficients of individual controls are much smaller 
than those associated with the country dummies. In terms of marginal effect,19 the 
probability of thinking that cheating on government benefits is never justifiable 
increases by 3 percent if the respondent is Protestant rather than a nonreligious per‑
son and by 1 percent by year of education.
We also perform several robustness checks. Since our mapping of the originally 
scaled 1–10 civic variable into a 1–0 dummy is arbitrary, we rerun ordered probit 
estimates on the original 1–10 civic variable. We found little change in the ordering 
of countries. In particular, the correlation between the country fixed effects esti‑
mated with these two different specifications is almost perfect, with the R² reaching 
0.94.20
We end this section by looking at the cross‑country heterogeneity in the trust 
variable. As discussed above, this variable measures the beliefs of individuals about 
19 The coefficients reported in the tables correspond to the probit estimates. We use the corresponding mar‑
ginal coefficients when interpreting the size effects in the text.
20 We also tried different mapping of the original 1–10 variable into a 1–0 dummy variable by grouping 
together the first two or the first three answers, but without any noticeable change. The tables of results are avail‑
able upon request.
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the trustworthiness of others. It could thus be an important determinant of the politi‑
cal support for generous unemployment benefits. We estimate the marginal coun‑
try fixed effect on the probability that the respondent answers yes to the question: 
“generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people?” We run this regression on the three 
WVS waves and control for the same set of individual characteristics as we did for 
the civic variable. The marginal country fixed effects are reported in Appendix D. 
The ordering of countries with respect to the trust variable and the civic variable are 
similar. Nordic countries are very trusting countries, while Mediterranean and, to 
a lesser extent, Continental European countries display a very low level of trust in 
each other. The Anglo‑Saxon countries fall in the middle. As it happens, the cor‑
relation between national components of civicmindedness and trust is fairly high, 
the coefficient of correlation being equal to 0.66, and the R2 reaching 0.54. These 
two indicators provide complementary information on the extent of civic attitudes 
in each country.
B. Correlation Between Civic Attitudes and Labor Market Institutions
Data on unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection.—We use differ‑
ent indicators to measure the extent of the generosity of unemployment benefits. The 
first indicator consists of public expenditure per unemployed person, as a percentage 
of GDP per capita. This indicator is given by the OECD social expenditure database 
during the period 1980–2003. This database reports the total public expenditure 
on unemployment benefits. We then calculate public expenditure per unemployed 
worker by dividing this indicator by the yearly number of unemployed people in 
each country, and divide the amount by the GDP per capita.
This first indicator has the advantage of combining information on both the level 
and length of unemployment benefits. This measure is more comprehensive than 
traditional indicators of replacement rate and benefit duration taken separately. 
However, a potential concern with this indicator is that it could be endogenous with 
respect to the composition of unemployment. For instance, this indicator might be 
high in a country which has a high proportion of long‑term unemployed and high‑
benefit duration.
We check the robustness of the results by constructing a composite index based on 
the replacement rate and the length of benefits. The replacement rate (RR) is taken 
from the OECD database on unemployment insurance. The benefit duration index 
(BD) is provided by the indicator of Stephen Nickell et al. (2001), which accounts for 
decreasing replacement rate by duration. The benefit duration indicator is a weighted 
average of the ratio of the replacement rate received during the first year of unem‑
ployment over the replacement rate received during the second and third year, and 
the ratio of the first year replacement rate over the replacement rate received the 
fourth and fifth years. If benefit provision is constant over the unemployment years, 
the indicator is equal to one. We then use the indicators of benefit duration and 
replacement rate to construct a composite index equal to the average of these two 
indicators. We also check the robustness of the results by looking at the replacement 
rate and the benefit duration taken separately.
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The measure of employment protection draws upon the OECD indicator of the 
stringency of job protection over temporary and regular contract. This employment 
protection indicator combines both the procedural difficulty to lay off workers and 
the level of layoff taxes. The OECD indicator then adds up the country scores along 
these different dimensions of employment protection. It can take values between 
zero and six. In our database, the indicator takes on values ranging from 0.2 to 4.1, 
the higher the level of this index, the more stringent the employment protection 
becomes.
To illustrate the cross‑country heterogeneity in the trade‑off between unemploy‑
ment benefits and employment protection, Figure 3 presents a simple correlation 
between the ratio UB/EP and civic attitudes. Public expenditure per unemployed 
and the OECD employment protection index are averaged for the period 1980–2003, 
consistently with the time span of the WVS database. The marginal country fixed 
effects on civic attitudes are derived from the pooled probit estimation over the three 
waves (1980, 1990, and 2000). Figure 3 shows a steady, positive correlation between 
civic attitudes and the UB/EP ratio. Nordic countries, which display higher civic 
attitudes, tend to insure their workers through unemployment benefits instead of 
employment protection. In contrast, countries with lower civic attitudes are more 
prone to protect jobs rather than unemployment spells. Anglo‑Saxon countries also 
fit into this picture well. Even if public policies, taken as a whole, play a lesser role in 
an Anglo‑saxon country like the United States, the latter tends to insure the workers 
more through unemployment benefits than layoff taxes. This result is consistent with 
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of employment protection. Civic attitudes are measured by the estimated marginal country fixed effects in the 
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the fact that civic attitudes are more developed in the Anglo‑Saxon countries relative 
to Mediterranean and Continental European countries. In Appendix E, we report 
separate evidence on the cross‑country heterogeneity in UB and EP, respectively, 
and the correlation at stake with national civic attitudes.
Correlation Between Labor Market Institutions and Civic Attitudes.—This sec‑
tion provides simple evidence on cross‑country correlations between civic attitudes 
and UB and EP institutions by running the following type of regressions:
(9) Ict 5 h0 1 h1Fc, t 1 h2E 1Xit Z c 2 1 ect ,
where Ict denotes UB or EP at date t in country c. Fc, t stands for the country average 
of civic attitudes at date t, conditional on the individual characteristics of individual 
i such as age, number of years of education, employment status, and religious affili‑
ation. These national features of civic attitudes are captured by the country fixed 
effects estimated in the previous section, but for each period t. E 1Xit Z c 2 denotes a 
vector of the average characteristics of the population and other potential aggregate 
factors.
We run generalized least square regressions of the different insurance institu‑
tions on the country fixed effects capturing national civic attitudes controlling for 
heteroskedacity. To get the maximum amount of observations for this cross‑country 
comparison, we run separate probit estimates on the civic variable for the three 
waves (1980, 1990, and 2000). Public policies are measured by averaging the indi‑
cators for unemployment generosity and employment protection in the early 1980s 
(1980–1984), the early 1990s (1990–1994) and the early 2000s (2000–2003). The 
panel of observations is not balanced since some countries are missing during the 
1980 wave of the WVS database. In addition, the number of observations drops 
when we use the replacement rate and the benefit duration indicators since they are 
not documented for all Eastern European and Latin American countries.
We also include additional variables for E 1Xit Z c 2 which could drive the relation‑
ship between labor market institutions and civic attitudes. Labor market institutions 
and civic attitudes could be linked to national income 1gdpk 2 , proxied by the GDP 
per capita in 1995 US dollars (billion). We also include the degree of openness of 
the country (openness), which could give rise to more uncertainty for households 
and could have fueled their need for more insurance (Jonas Agell 2001). This vari‑
able measures the share of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP and is given 
by the Penn World Table. The data are taken as averages for the period 1980–1984, 
1990–1994, and 2000–2003. All regressions control for time period dummies.
Table 2, row I reports the regression of UB and EP indicators on civic attitudes, 
measured by the marginal country fixed effects in the probit regression of the 1–0 
civic variable. A positive and statistically significant relationship at the 1 percent 
level shows up between this measure of civic values and the generosity of unem‑
ployment benefits no matter what index is used to measure unemployment benefits. 
Columns 1 through 4 show that this statistically significant relationship holds for the 
public expenditures per unemployed, the replacement rate index (RR), the benefit 
duration index (BD), and the weighted average of benefit duration and replacement 
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rate, respectively. The same result holds when we restrict the comparison to exactly 
the same sample of countries for each indicator. The coefficients are economically 
sizeable. Column 1 indicates that a 1 percent increase in the probability of saying it 
is never justifiable to cheat on government benefits would be associated with a rise 
of 0.39 percent in expenditure per unemployed and an increase of 0.58 percent in the 
replacement rate.
Table 2, column 5 shows that the stringency of employment protection legislation 
is correlated negatively with country civic values. The negative relationship is statis‑
tically significant at the 1 percent level and economically sizeable. To get a sense of 
the economic magnitude of the OLS coefficient, we rescale the EP indicator between 
0–1 so that it amounts to zero in the country displaying the lowest employment pro‑
tection legislation, while the indicator is equal to one in the country with the most 
stringent  legislation. With this rescaling, it turns out that a 1 percent increase in civic 
values would be associated with a 0.7 percent decrease in employment protection 
legislation.
Table 3, row I presents the regression of the ratio UB/EP on country civic attitudes. 
The measure for UB is given by public expenditure per unemployed in column 1 and 
Table 2—Civic Attitudes and Labor Market Institutions: GLS Estimates 1980–2003
Unemployment benefits 1UB2 Employment 
protection
Expenditure per 
unemployed 112 Replacement rate 122 Benefit duration 132 RR–BD 142  EP 152
Civic attitudes 11–02 0.397*** 0.588*** 0.329*** 0.424*** 22.849***
 1I2 10.1052 10.0602 10.0812 10.0632 10.5012
 n 57 48 48 48 57
Civic attitudes 11–102 0.106*** 0.170*** 0.115*** 0.140*** 20.930***
 1II2 10.0342 10.0332 10.0322 10.0202 10.1432
 n 57 48 48 48 57
Trust 11–02 0.478*** 0.771*** 0.147 0.369*** 22.733***
 1III2 10.1112 10.0732 10.1122 10.0812 10.7572
 n 54 47 47 47 55
note: Additional controls: GDP per capita, openness, and time dummies.
Table 3 —Civic Attitudes and the UB/EP Trade‑off: GLS Estimates 1980–2003
UB/EP UB/EP
Public expenditure per unemployed/EP Composite index RR‑BD/EP
Civic attitudes 11–02 0.378*** 0.620***
 1I2 10.0442 10.1932
 n 56 48
Civic attitudes 11–102 0.108*** 0.200***
 1II2 10.0142 10.0632
 n 55 48
Trust 11–02 0.556*** 0.720**
 1III2 10.0812 10.2442
 n 54 47
note: Additional controls: GDP per capita, openness, and time dummies.
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by the composite index of replacement rate and benefit duration in column 2. In both 
cases, the ratio of UB over EP is correlated positively with country civic attitudes. 
The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level for both measures of 
public expenditure per unemployed and the composite index of replacement rate and 
benefit duration. The effects are also economically sizeable. A 1 percent increase in 
civic attitudes would lead to a 0.37 percent increase in the UB/EP ratio.
We check the robustness of this correlation pattern by looking at different indica‑
tors for civic attitudes. We first measure country civic attitudes by using the origi‑
nally coded 1–10 civic variable. In that case, country civic attitudes correspond to 
the country fixed effects estimated by ordered probit, and thus do not have any direct 
economic interpretation. But row II in Tables 2 and 3 shows that the same statisti‑
cally significant correlation pattern holds between this measure of civicmindedness 
and UB and EP institutions. We also test to what extent the UB/EP trade‑off can be 
associated with the cross‑country heterogeneity in the level of trust. Country lev‑
els of trust are measured by the marginal country fixed effects estimated by probit 
regression on the trust variable. Row III of Tables 2 and 3 shows that the correlation 
pattern between insurance policies and the trust variable is similar to that found with 
the civic variable. And the coefficients are of the same order of magnitude as the 
ones found with the 1–0 civic variable.
time Variation in Civic Attitudes and Labor Market Institutions.—Even if civic 
attitudes and labor market institutions have experienced little change over the last 
two decades of the twentieth century, it might be of interest to analyze the correla‑
tion between the time variation in civic attitudes and changes in UB and EP. To 
investigate this dimension, we need to control for country fixed effects in the previ‑
ous regressions. Moreover, including these country effects allows us to control for 
other time invariant national features which could affect the design of unemploy‑
ment insurance and employment protection.
In order to get enough time variation in civic attitudes, we look at attitudes at two 
different dates that are distant enough. We select only the two waves 1980 and 2000 
henceforth. The data for the dependent variables and the other controls are taken as 
averages for the periods of 1980–1984 and 2000–2003. Moreover, we focus on the 
indicator of civic attitudes that displays the main variation across this period. For 
that purpose, we focus on the beliefs in the trustworthiness of others measured by 
the 1–0 trust variable.21
Figure 4 reports a scatterplot of the changes in the ratio UB over EP on changes in 
the country level of trust. The y‑axis reports the difference in the ratio between 2000 
and 1980, while the x‑axis reports the difference in the country level of trust between 
the two periods. The correlation is positive and highly significant, 78 percent of the 
variation in the UB‑EP ratio being associated with changes in the country level of 
trust. In all countries, the level of trust has decreased between 1980 and 2000, rela‑
tive to Denmark. But countries which have experienced the lowest drop, such as the 
Netherlands and Germany, are also those where the ratio of  unemployment  benefits 
21 The results are statistically less significant when we measure civic attitudes with the 1–0 civic variable, 
which displays less time variation than the 1–0 trust variable.
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over employment protection has increased in line with Denmark. In contrast, this 
ratio has decreased mainly in Anglo‑Saxon countries, due to a drop in unemploy‑
ment benefit generosity, while their country level of trust has experienced the sharp‑
est decline between 1980 and 2000. These results provide tentative evidence that 
trustworthiness, civicmindedness, and labor market institutions have moved together 
over the last two decades.
Table 4 reports OLS estimates of the within correlation between civic attitudes 
and unemployment benefits (UB), employment protection (EP), and the ratio of 
these two variables (UB/EP). We measure civic attitudes with the country fixed 
effects associated with the 1–0 trust variable. Column 1 shows that there is a posi‑
tive correlation between variations in civic attitudes and variations in the generosity 
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note: Correlation between changes in the ratio of UB over EP and changes in the country level of trust between 
2000 and 1980.
source: WVS and OECD.
Table 4—Time Variation in Civic Attitudes and Labor Market Institutions: OLS Estimates 
1980–2003
Expenditure  
per unemployed 
(1)
EP 
(2)
Public expend/EP 
(3)
RR‑BD/EP 
(4)
Trust (1–0) 0.450** 24.799* 1.355*** 1.673***
(0.194) (2.492) (0.239) (0.259)
Country fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Number 35 35 35 31
note: Additional controls: GDP per capita, openness, and time dummies.
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of  unemployment benefits measured by public expenditure per unemployed. The 
relationship is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 4, column 2 reports the panel regression of employment protection on 
civic attitudes. The relationship turns out to be negative and statistically signifi‑
cant. Table 4, column 3 reports the panel regression of the ratio UB over EP on the 
country levels of civic attitudes, where UB is measured by public expenditure per 
unemployed. Column 4 reports the same regression when we measure the ratio UB 
over EP by using the composite index of replacement rate and benefit duration. An 
increase in trust in others turns out to be associated with a rise in unemployment 
benefits relative to employment protection. The correlations are statistically signifi‑
cant at the one percent level and are of the same order for the two ratios.
Naturally, at this stage, one should be careful interpreting this evolution as a rela‑
tion of causality. Variations in social attitudes are likely to be influenced in turn by 
changes in economic policies.
C. Instrumental Variable Estimates
The previous estimates of equation (9) suggest that the correlation between civic 
attitudes and labor market institutions may reflect an influence of civic attitudes on 
labor market institutions. Now, we give further evidence on this causal relation‑
ship by showing that the inherited civic attitudes are significantly correlated with 
unemployment benefits and employment protection. By definition, civic attitudes 
are inherited if they are not determined by the current economic and institutional 
environment of the country in which people live. In order to evaluate the inherited 
part of civic attitudes, we estimate the influence of the country of origin on the atti‑
tudes of people who were born in and are living in the United States. We then use 
the inherited part of civic attitudes of Americans coming from different countries of 
origin as an instrument for civic attitudes of people in the home countries. Note that 
reverse causality could still be an issue if past labor market institutions affected civic 
attitudes of people who came to the United States and thus still influence the civic 
values passed on to their descendants. Yet, this problem might not be an issue here 
since unemployment insurance and employment protection legislation was reshaped 
after the 1973 oil crisis in most countries. The features of unemployment benefits 
and employment protection observed over the last two decades of the twentieth cen‑
tury are thus unlikely to have affected the civic attitudes of the ancestors of the 
sample of Americans we focus on, since these ancestors were living in countries 
with very different labor market institutions by that time.
Civic Attitudes in the united states and in the home Countries.—For consistency 
with the previous estimations of civic attitudes in the home countries, equation (8), 
we run the following probit estimates on individual civic attitudes of Americans:
(10)  a˜ jct 5 a˜  1 F˜c 1 g˜ X˜ jt 1 F˜t 1 e˜ jct.
The left‑hand‑side variable a˜ jct represents the civic attitudes of American j in 
period t whose ancestors came from country c. X˜ jt is our measure of individual 
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 characteristics, and F˜t are time dummies. Our main variables of interest are the dum‑
mies F˜c representing the country of origin c of American j. These dummies cap‑
ture the inherited part of civic attitudes transmitted from the country of origin and 
passed down through generations. We estimate this inherited component and evalu‑
ate to what extent inherited attitudes from the country of origin are correlated with 
current civic attitudes in the home country.
Data on civic attitudes of Americans by country of origin are provided by the 
General Social Survey database (GSS). This database reports a question on civic 
attitudes similar to that of the WVS database for two waves, 1991 and 1998. The 
question reads as follows: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a person gives 
the government incorrect information about himself to get government benefits that 
he is not entitled to.” The answer is scaled between one to four for “Not wrong,” “A 
bit wrong,” “Wrong,” and “Seriously wrong.” In line with our classification for the 
WVS database, we group the answer categories together to represent individuals 
with strong civic attitudes. Hence, we create a dummy variable which takes on the 
value one if the respondent answered “Seriously wrong” and zero otherwise. As a 
robustness check, all the estimations have also been run on the original variables 
without any significant changes in the results.
Table 5—Civic Attitudes by Country of Origin and in the Home Country: Probit Estimates
Unjustifiable/seriously wrong to cheat on
government benefits 5 1
Country of origin
GSS 1991 and 1998112 Home countryWVS 1990 and 2000122
Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error
Age 0.001 10.0022 0.009*** 10.0002
Men 20.110 10.0642 20.052*** 10.0102
Education 0.047*** 10.0122 0.031*** 10.0012
Austria 20.228*** 10.0632 20.670*** 10.0382
Belgium 20.679*** 10.0462 21.040*** 10.0372
Canada 20.303*** 10.0332 20.379*** 10.0392
Denmark            Reference
France 20.337*** 10.0232 21.065*** 10.0382
Germany 20.257*** 10.0202 20.819*** 10.0352
Greece 20.578*** 10.0342 21.677*** 10.0542
Hungary 0.132*** 10.0202 20.399*** 10.0402
Ireland 20.300*** 10.0182 20.610*** 10.0392
Italy 20.373*** 10.0212 20.649*** 10.0372
Mexico 20.760*** 10.0842 21.324*** 10.0392
Netherlands 0.053*** 10.0232 20.023 10.0392
Norway 20.203*** 10.0122 20.252*** 10.0382
Poland 20.517*** 10.0202 20.785*** 10.0382
Spain 20.432*** 10.0242 20.780*** 10.0352
United Kingdom 20.275*** 10.0152 20.430*** 10.0392
Pseudo‑R2 0.041 0.090
Observations 1,467 44,149
note: Probit estimates with robust standard errors:
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The GSS database also reports information on the birth place and the country of 
origin of the respondent’s forebears obtained by the following question: “From what 
countries or part of the world did your ancestors come from?” Origins cover almost 
all OECD countries that are referenced in the WVS database. To get interpretable 
estimates, we select countries of origin with at least 15 observations. This leaves us 
with the following countries of origin: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. Civic attitudes by country of origin are calculated 
as an average on the 1991 and 1998 waves of the General Social Survey.22
Table 5 reports the probit estimates of the coefficients F˜c and Fc showing up in 
equations (10) and (8). The explained variable is scaled one if people say that cheat‑
ing on government benefits is seriously wrong or never justifiable. For estimates in 
the home countries, we still use the WVS database. We run the estimations on the 
waves 1990 and 2000 in order to focus on a time period comparable to that of the 
GSS database. We control for the same set of individual characteristics including 
age, gender, years of education, income levels, and religious affiliations. Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering at the country‑of‑origin level and at the country‑
of‑residency level. Year dummies are included in both regressions. Denmark is con‑
sidered the reference for the country of Americans ancestry and for the country of 
residency for respondents in the corresponding home countries.
22 An alternative would have been to separate the estimations for the two different GSS waves in 1991 and late 
1998. But due to the limitation of observations by country of origin, we cannot perform separate regressions for 
the two waves without losing a large amount of country of origins.
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Table 5, column 1, reports the estimates of the F˜c coefficients. It shows that to 
have forebearers coming from a different country of origin than Denmark has 
a sizeable negative effect on the probability of finding it unjustifiable to cheat 
on government benefits. The effect is always statistically significant. The gap 
is the most sizeable for Americans with Mexican origins or Mediterranean and 
Continental European origins. If we compute the marginal coefficients, civic atti‑
tudes of Americans with Mexican origins or Greek origins are 29 and 21 percent 
lower, respectively, than that of Americans with Danish forebears. Respondents 
with Mediterranean origins from Italy or France come next. Their civic attitudes 
being 14 and 13 percent lower, respectively, than Americans with Danish origins. 
Americans whose ancestors came from the United Kingdom, Canada, or Norway 
also have lower levels of civic attitudes, but the gap for Americans with Danish 
origins is less significant.
Table 5, column 2 reports the corresponding probit estimates for Fc in the home 
countries by using the waves 1990 and 2000 of the WVS database. In line with the 
previous estimates of the entire period 1980–2000, we find that living in Mexico or in 
the Mediterranean and Continental European countries significantly reduces the level 
of civic attitudes in comparison to people living in Denmark. The country fixed effects 
are all significant at the one percent level, with the exception of the Netherlands. The 
sizes of the coefficients associated with the home country are in general more impor‑
tant than those of the country of origin. But the ordering of countries is fairly similar.
Figure 5 reports the correlation between the marginal effects of the country of 
origin on the x‑axis against the marginal effects of the home country on the y‑axis. 
The standard error of civic attitudes is much higher across the home country than 
across the country of origin of Americans. This result suggests that living in the 
United States has a homogenizing effect on values. But as it happens, the correlation 
between civic attitudes by country of origin and civic attitudes in the home country 
is fairly high, with the R‑squared reaching 54 percent. We also checked the robust‑
ness of the results by using the original rank of the civic variable. A strong correla‑
tion pattern still holds between civic attitudes of Americans by country of origin and 
civic attitudes in the home country.
Since the low number of observations for certain countries of origin might be 
a concern, we check the robustness of our results by using the trust question. For 
each wave from 1977 to 2002, the GSS database provides a question on trust with 
exactly the same wording as the one in the WVS database: “generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people?” The answer is given on the same 1–0 scale, the variable being 
equal to one if the respondents believe in the trustworthiness of others and zero 
otherwise. Looking at the trust variable during the period of 1977–2002 helps us to 
increase significantly the number of observations by country of origin, as shown in 
Appendix D. For instance, we have 118 observations of Americans of Danish origin 
for the trust variable against 20 observations for the civic variable. In Appendix F, 
we show that the same strong correlation pattern shows up between inherited trust 
of Americans by country of origin estimated during the period of 1977–2002, and 
trust in their home countries estimated in the three waves of the WVS database. The 
R‑squared between inherited trust and trust in the home country reaches 0.59. This 
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finding shows that inherited civic attitudes and inherited trust of Americans might 
be a relevant instrument for the current attitudes in the home country.
IV Regressions of Labor Market Institutions on Civic Attitudes.—We now docu‑
ment the impact of civic attitudes on UB and EP by running the following two‑stage 
regressions:
(11)  Ict 5 h0 1 h1Fc, t 1 h2E 1Xit Z c 2 1 ect ,
(12)  Fc, t 5 b0 1 b1E 1a˜ it Z c 2 1 b2E 1Xit Z c 2 1 vct .
Equation (11) is similar to equation (9) where labor market institutions are 
regressed on civic attitudes. Equation (12) represents the first‑stage regression of 
civic attitudes in the home country on civic attitudes of Americans by country of 
origin, where E 1a˜ it Z c 2 stands for the average civic attitudes, a˜ it , of Americans whose 
ancestors came from country c.
The left‑hand‑side variable, Ict, represents either unemployment benefits (UB), 
employment protection (EP), or the ratio UB over EP. We use the OECD indica‑
tor on public expenditure per unemployed and the OECD job protection index. We 
have also checked the robustness of the results by using the composite index of the 
replacement rate and benefit length. In line with the previous OLS estimates, the 
results are not modified significantly, but the sample of countries covered by this 
composite index is smaller.
The control variables of interest are the country fixed effects of civic values in the 
home country, instrumented by the country of origin fixed effects associated with civic 
values of Americans. We also account for the additional control variables E 1Xit Z c 2 , 
including the average number of years of education of the labor force 1educ 2 , the GDP 
per capita 1gdpk 2 , and the degree of openness of the country 1openness 2 .
Moreover, we provide a last specification in which we check to what extent 
the results are not driven by some clustering of countries. In particular, most of 
the differences in labor market institutions could be driven by the existence of a 
Mediterranean model characterized by stringent employment protection and low 
unemployment benefits. Civic attitudes could be statistically significant only to 
the extent that they pick up North versus South differences. Thus, we include a 
Mediterranean dummy for France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece. We also test 
the robustness with respect to a dummy for Nordic countries without noticeable 
change. Furthermore, the previous OLS estimates have shown that the relationship 
between civic attitudes and labor market institutions remain statistically significant 
when country fixed effects are controlled for.23
23 A potential concern has to do with the existence of omitted variables. It still might be the case that some 
national features, such as legal origins and past institutions, which were already at work when people migrated to 
the United States, could co‑determine both civic attitudes of their descendants and current labor market institu‑
tions. To control for such omitted variables, ideally, one needs to get some time variation in the instruments for 
civic attitudes. This time variation would allow the inclusion of country fixed effects in the regression of labor 
market institutions on civic values and control for any invariant national features. For instance, Algan and Cahuc 
(2007) show how to exploit the time‑variation dimension in inherited social attitudes of Americans to uncover the 
causal effect of trust on the economic growth of the home countries since the post‑war period. Unfortunately, the 
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Table 6, panel A reports the first‑stage estimate of civic attitudes in the home 
country on civic attitudes of Americans by country of origin. Column (1) reports the 
results of the regression without any controls. Column (2) includes additional con‑
trols. Column (3) also includes a Mediterranean dummy. Whatever the specification, 
there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between inherited civic 
attitudes and civic attitudes in the home country.
Table 6, panels B and C repeat the same first‑stage regression, but on trust atti‑
tudes. Panel B reports the simple cross‑country, first‑stage regression. Panel C uses 
information from the different waves of the WVS and GSS databases. Because 
the variable trust is documented since 1977 in the GSS database, we have enough 
information to average the level of trust at two different dates. The GSS surveys 
from 1977 to 1990 are used to calculate the level of trust in the period ranging 
from the 1980s to the early 1990s. They are associated with the two waves of 
the WVS database, 1980 and 1990. Note that we group together the WVS waves 
1980 and 1990 to have the largest possible sample of countries over that period, 
the wave 1980 being less documented. The GSS surveys from 1991 to 2002 are 
used to calculate the level of trust in the 1990s and 2000s and are associated with 
the wave 2000 of the WVS database. We have tried different partitions without 
significant change as long as the number of observations by country of origin was 
short time span since UI and EP have been implemented make it impossible to exploit such time variation in civic 
attitudes. At this point, we focus only on the issue of reverse causality.
Table 6—First‑Stage Estimates of Attitudes in the Home Country 
on Inherited Attitudes of Americans112 122 132
Panel A: Dependent variable: Civic attitudes in the home country
Inherited civic attitudes of Americans 1.405*** 0.710*** 0.794***
 from their country of origin 10.2472 10.2352 10.2742
Controls 1openness, gdpk, educ 2 No Yes*** Yes***
Medit. dummy No No Yes***
Adjusted R2 0.667 0.738 0.814
Number 16 16 16
Panel B: Dependent variable: trust in the home country
Inherited trust of Americans 1.331*** 1.092*** 0.923**
 from their country of origin 10.3652 10.3802 10.4002
Controls 1openness, gdpk, educ 2 No Yes*** Yes***
Medit. dummy No No Yes***
Adjusted R2 0.411 0.483 0.514
Number 19 19 19
Panel C: Dependent variable: trust in the home country
Inherited trust of Americans from their 0.892*** 0.807*** 0.665***
 country of origin 1977–1990 & 1991–2002 10.2272 10.2162 10.2262
Controls 1openness, gdpk, educ 2 No Yes*** Yes***
Medit. dummy No No Yes***
Adjusted R2 0.594 0.645 0.671
Number 32 32 32
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 approximately equal between the two different samples. This specification also 
includes period dummies.
Table 6, panels B and C show that the same statistically significant correla‑
tion shows up between inherited trust and trust in the home country. In par‑
ticular, panel C shows that the correlation is also statistically significant at the 
1 percent level when we use two different dates and we increase the number of 
observations.24
Table 7 reports the second‑stage regression on labor market institutions when we 
use inherited civic attitudes from the country of origin as an instrument for civic atti‑
tudes in the home country. For consistency with the first‑stage estimates above, col‑
umn 1 reports simple estimates without any additional controls. Column 2 includes 
24 We have also tried a specification including country fixed effects in order to estimate the correlation between 
changes in inherited trust in the United States and changes in trust in the home country. The correlation was not 
statistically significant, however. The most plausible explanation for that result is that the time span of estimation 
is too short to take into account changes in the transmission of attitudes. Actually, Algan and Cahuc (2007) show 
that changes in inherited trust are significantly and positively correlated with changes in trust in the home country 
when we focus on second‑generation Americans, and we look at two different cohorts, which do not overlap, by 
selecting working‑age people in the 1950s and the 2000s. We cannot use this strategy here since the institutions 
UB and EP have been put in place during a more recent period, mainly during the 1970s.
Table 7—Second‑Stage Regression of Labor Market Institutions 1I2112 122 132
Panel A: Dependent variable: uB
Civic attitudes 0.811*** 0.710*** 0.794**1IV: Inherited civic attitudes of Americans 2 10.2482 10.2372 10.2742
Controls 1openness, gdpk 2 No Yes*** Yes***
Medit. dummy No No Yes***
Number 16 16 16
Adjusted R2 0.404 0.563 0.574
Panel B: Dependent variable: EP
Civic attitudes 22.913** 22.993** 22.3421IV: Inherited civic attitudes of Americans 2 11.3492 11.3702 11.5092
Controls 1openness, gdpk 2 No Yes*** Yes***
Medit. dummy No No Yes***
Number 16 16 16
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.478 0.538
Panel C: Dependent variable: Ratio uB/EP
Civic attitudes 0.585*** 0.548*** 0.551***1IV: Inherited civic attitudes of Americans 2 10.1652 10.1562 10.1462
Controls 1openness, gdpk 2 No Yes*** Yes*
Medit. dummy No No Yes***
Number 16 16 16
Adjusted R2 0.534 0.667 0.667
Panel D: Dependent variable: Ratio uB/EP
Trust 0.900*** 0.876** 0.841*1IV: Inherited trust of Americans from their  
 country of origin 1977–1990 & 1991–20022 10.3512 10.3842 10.5002
Controls 1openness, gdpk 2 No Yes*** Yes***
Medit. dummy No No Yes***
Number 32 32 32
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.196 0.214
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openness, GDP per capita, and education as additional controls. Column 3 adds also 
a Mediterranean dummy. For each specification, we find the instrumented values of 
civicmindedness have a significant impact on UB, EP, and the ratio UB/EP.
To get a sense of the economic impact of civic attitudes on insurance institutions, 
we run the following counter‑factual experiment. We evaluate what would have been 
the gap in labor market institutions if a different population had inherited the same 
civic attitudes as the Danish over the period 1980–2003.25 This comparison is based 
on the second‑stage estimates including the different controls and dummies. The 
effects are sizeable. Had the French, the Italians, and the Greeks inherited the same 
civic attitudes as the Danish, the generosity of unemployment insurance would have 
been 8.6 percent higher, 9.8 percent higher, and 13.6 percent higher, respectively. 
Conversely, the stringency of the employment protection legislation would have been 
15.8 percent lower in France, 16.6 percent lower in Italy, and 25.9 percent lower in 
Greece.
Finally, to increase the number of observations, we also look at the second‑stage 
estimates by using the trust variable. To get as many observations as possible, we run 
these estimates over the two different periods representing the 1980s and the 2000s, 
as discussed above. The institutions are averaged over the periods 1980–1984 and 
2000–2003. Table 7, panel D reports the second‑stage regression of labor market 
institutions when we use inherited trust as an instrument. We find inherited trust has 
a statistically significant impact on the ratio UB over EP, and the economic effect is of 
the same order of magnitude as that found with inherited civic attitudes. These results 
provide tentative evidence of a causal effect of cooperative attitudes, such as civic‑
mindedness and trust, on the design of insurance institutions on the labor market.
III. Conclusion
This paper argues that civic virtue is a key ingredient for implementing efficient 
insurance institutions against labor market risks by lowering the moral hazard issue 
that plagues unemployment insurance. To that extent civic attitudes could provide an 
explaination of the observed trade‑off between unemployment benefits and employ‑
ment protection across OECD countries. In countries displaying low levels of civic 
attitudes towards cheating over government benefits, it is less costly to insure people 
on the job through employment protection rather than during the unemployment 
spell with unemployment benefits, even if this choice might be harmful for the effi‑
ciency of the labor market.
This paper has focused on public insurance schemes in the labor market. But the 
logic of the argument might apply to any form of social insurance designed to insure 
individuals against bad shocks to earnings capacity. In particular, a similar cross‑
country pattern holds for public transfers in the health care system, such as disability 
insurance, that are plagued with moral hazard issues.26 A promising line of research 
25 This variation is equal to h1 b1 E 1 a˜  it Z c 2 , where the coefficients b1 is given in the first‑stage estimate and 
corresponds to the coefficients of the second‑stage estimate.
26 Further estimates on the impact of civic attitudes on disability insurance are available upon request.
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would be to investigate the role of civic culture in shaping the various dimensions of 
the welfare state system.
This conclusion raises important questions about the scope of and the instruments 
for policy reform. Naturally, civic attitudes seem to be persistent, and it might take 
time to change such attitudes. But growing empirical evidence shows that the insti‑
tutional and the economic environments can shape civicmindedness and trust in the 
long run. See Tabellini (2007) for the role of historical institutions or Assar Lindbeck 
and Sten Nyberg (2006) for the role of parents. Thus, the future of the welfare state 
systems might depend on the ability of finding adequate policies for fostering civic 
virtue and social cooperation as shown by Aghion, Algan, and Cahuc (2008).
Appendix
A. the Optimal Policy 1t, f , b 2
The maximization program of the government is
 max 31 2 g 1X 2 4v 1w 2 1 g 1X 2v 1b 2 dh 1h 2 2 e,
 w, b, X
subject to
(A1) 3
X
1`
 1x 2 w 2 dg 1x) 2 g 1X 2b 5 k,
(A2) 31 2 g 1X 2 4v 1w 2 1 g 1X 2 v 1b 2 2 e $ v 1b 2 2 g.
Let us denote the Lagrangian of this program by L and the Lagrange multipliers 
associated with contraints (A1) and (A2) by m1, and m2, respectively. The first‑order 
conditions read
 0L
(A3)    5 0 3 v9 1w 2 11 1 m22 5 m1,
 0w
 0L 1 2 g 1X2
(A4)    5 0 3 v9 1b 2 5 m1 1 m2      v9 1b 2 , 0w g 1X2
and
 0L 1 1 m2(A5)    5 0 3 X 5 w 2 b 2 3v 1w 2 2 v 1b 2 4 a   b .
 0w m1
The first‑order conditions lead us to analyze two cases.
Case 1: g $ e
In that case, m2 5 0 implies, according to equations (A5), (A3), and (A4), that 
b 5 w. When b 5 w and g $ e, the incentive compatibility constraint (A2) is not 
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binding. Therefore, there is full insurance and equation (A5) implies that X 5 0. Then, 
the free entry condition implies that w 5 e01`x dg 1x 2 2 k.
Case 2: g , e
In that case, m2 5 0, which still implies, according to equations (A5), (A3), 
and (A4), that b 5 w, is impossible because the incentive compatibility constraint 
(A2) cannot be satisfied. Therefore, m2 . 0 means that the incentive compatibility 
constraint (A2) is binding. Equation (A3) can be written as v9 1w 2 5 m1 / 11 1 m22 . 
Substituting this expression into (A5) yields
 v 1w 2 2 v 1b 2
(A6) X 5 w 2 b 2      .
 v9 1w 2
Therefore, the optimal value of 1w, X, b 2 is defined by (A6), the zero profit condi‑
tion (A1), and the binding incentive compatibility constraint (A2). These three equa‑
tions imply that
 e 2 g
 v 1w 2 2 v 1b 2 5      . 0.
 1 2 g 1X2
B. static Comparative Properties of b and X
Let us show that the optimal values of X and b are increasing with respect to g 
when g , e.
The optimal value of 1w, X, b 2 is defined by the zero profit condition:
(B7) 3
X
1`
 1x 2 w 2 dg 1x 2 2 g 1X )b 5 k,
and
 v 1w 2 2 v 1b 2
(B8) X 5 w 2 b 2      .
 v9 1w 2
 e 2 g
(B9) v 1w 2 2 v 1b 2 5      . 0.
 1 2 g 1X2
The zero profit condition (B7) implicitly defines w as a function of X and b. Let us 
denote by w 1X, b 2 this function, for which the partial derivatives are
 0w 1X, b 2 g9 1X2
      5      1w 2 X 2 b 2 ,
 0X 1 2 g 1X2
 0w 1X, b 2 2g 1X2
      5     .
 0b 1 2 g 1X2
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When w 5 w 1X, b 2 , the differentiation of equations (B8) and (B9) with respect to 
X, b, and g yields
 db 1
(B10)    5              . 0,
 dg g 1X2v9 1w 2 1 31 2 g 1X2 4v9 1b 2
Table 8—Sample of Countries in WVS and GSS
WVS GSS: Surveys on civicness GSS: Surveys on trust
1980, 1990, 2000 1919 and 1998 1977–2002
Country Observations Observations Observations
Australia 3,131 — —
Austria 2,840  16 84
Belgium 5,508  15 19
Canada 4,844  56 339
Czech Republic 2,790  24 214
Denmark 2,807  20 118
France 3,725  54 344
Germany 5,382 341 3,034
Greece 1,107  12 51
Hungary 3,311  16 89
Ireland 3,199 246 2,067
Italy 5,328 116 870
Japan 3,378 — —
Mexico 4,761  77 367
Netherlands 3,038  32 266
Norway 3,558  33 311
Poland 1,998  62 476
Portugal 2,168 — —
Spain 8,778  19 111
Sweden 2,854 — 274
Switzerland 2,491 — —
United Kingdom 3,573 381 2,793
United States 5,242 — —
Table 9—Summary Statistics in WVS and GSS
WVS GSS
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Men 0.481 0.5 0.45 0.49
Age 42.807 17.278 45.78 17.72
Age education 17.317 3.582 13.04 2.80
Low‑income 0.426 0.494 0.467 0.492
Mid‑income 0.339 0.473 0.5 0.5
Up‑income 0.236 0.498 0.032 0.178
Catholic 0.413 0.492 0.304 0.460
Protestant 0.322 0.467 0.591 0.491
Muslim 0.043 0.202 0.00 0.00
Jewish 0.005 0.074 0.010 0.103
Buddhist 0.025 0.155 0.001 0.035
Others 0.025 0.155
No religion 0.168 0.374 0.092 0.289
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 v0 1w 2 3v9 1b 2 2 v9 1w 2 4 31 2 g 1X2 4 2 g 1X2 3v 1w 2 2 v 1b 2 4    
 dX  v9 1w 2 db
(B11)     5                            . 0.
 dg 31 2 g 1X2 4v9 1w 2 2 g9 1X2v0 1w 2 1X 2 w 1 b 22 dg
The last equation is positive because v is concave, and w . b when g , e.
C. Data on Attitudes
summary statistics.—Table 8 lists the sample of countries used in the WVS data‑
base and the GSS database. Table 9 shows the main individual characteristics of the 
respondents in these two surveys. The variable “Age” is expressed in years. The vari‑
able “Education” is the age at which the respondent completed her highest education. 
The variable “Income” derives from the question: “here is a scale of incomes. We 
would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, 
pensions and other income that come in.” The answers in the databases are scaled 
1–10. We constructed three categories: low income 11st–3rd deciles 2 , mean income 14th–6th deciles 2 and high income 17th–10th deciles 2 .
Evolution of Civic Attitudes.—Figure 6 reports the persistence of civic attitudes 
over time. It turns out that there is a strong correlation, within each country,27 
27 The WVS provides information for only 15 countries among our selected sample in 1980.
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notes: Mean reply to the question: “Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in 
between to claim government/state benefits to which you have no rights.” The score associated with the answer 
“never” is 1. The score of other answers is 0.
source: WVS 1980, 2000.
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between the share of people who think that it is never justifiable to cheat on govern‑
ment benefits in the 1980 and 2000 waves. Accordingly, the ordering of countries 
with regard to civic attitudes remains stable over time.
Cross-country heterogeneity in trust.—Figure 7 presents the marginal coun‑
try fixed effect on the probability that the respondent answers yes to the question: 
“generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people?” We run probit estimates on the 1–0 
trust variable covering the three waves by including country fixed effects and con‑
trolling for the same set of individual characteristics as we did for the civic variable. 
Denmark is still considered as the reference country.
D. Data on unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection
We report cross‑country evidence on the heterogeneity in unemployment benefits 
and employment protection. The different institutions are averaged over the period 
1980–2000. We also report the basic correlation with the country level of civic atti‑
tudes captured by the marginal coefficients of the country fixed effect in the probit 
regression of the 1–0 civic variable. This regression is run by pooling the three 
waves of the WVS database.
Figure 8 shows a strong positive correlation between expenditure per unem‑
ployed and civic attitudes. In general, Nordic countries tend to have higher civic 
attitudes and higher levels of expenditure per unemployed, while the correlation 
is the other way around for Mediterranean countries like Greece, France, and 
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notes: Marginal country effects associated with the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The score associated with the 
answer “yes” is 1, and 0 otherwise. 
source: WVS 1980, 1990, 2000.
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Spain. This first rough picture shows that 36 percent of the cross‑country hetero‑
geneity in public expenditure per unemployed is associated with the heterogene‑
ity in national civic attitudes. Figure 9 repeats the same exercise with respect to 
employment  protection. A negative correlation shows up between the stringency of 
 employment protection and national civic attitudes over that period. Mediterranean 
and Continental European countries tend to have both low civic attitudes and high 
employment protection legislation, while the reverse holds true for Nordic coun‑
tries. The Anglo‑Saxon countries stand a little apart from these two pictures since 
they have less employment protection and fewer unemployment benefits. Yet, by 
looking at the ratio of UB over EP reported in Figure 3, the Anglo‑Saxon countries 
turn out to be much closer to the Nordic countries with which they share higher 
civic values.
E. trust of Americans
This section reports the probit estimates on the 1–0 trust dummy by control‑
ling for the same individual characteristics as we did for the regression on the civic 
variable. The probit estimation is carried on the three waves 1980, 1990, and 2000 
for the WVS database and on the waves since 1977 of the GSS database. Figure 10 
reports the marginal effect associated with the country of residency on the y‑axis 
against the marginal effect associated with the country of origin of Americans on 
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note: Correlation between trust of Americans by country of origin and trust in the home countries.
source: GSS 1977–2002 and WVS 1980–2000.
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the x‑axis. As it happens, a fairly high correlation pattern shows up between trust of 
Americans by country of origin and trust in their home countries, with the R‑squared 
reaching 0.52.
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